BRICS: Global Aspiration Versus Internal Friction

Opinion

By Dr. Abhinav Pandya

In today’s phase of global turbulence and changing world, once purely academic and fancy jargons like “multipolarity” and “multipolar world order” have become loaded with meanings that now signify tensions and intense geopolitical rivalries. The BRICS grouping is one such organisation which was seen as a harbinger of a multipolar world order in a very constructive sense. However, this group—originally heralded as a development and economic bloc presenting the possibility of an alternative global financial architecture with better representation for the Global South—has since transmogrified into a new system that symbolises, or is rather projected as, an existential threat to the West-led world order.

In today’s conflict-ridden world, exaggerated apprehensions abound regarding BRICS as a terminal blow to the West-led world order and systems of global governance. However, once analysed in an objective and unbiased manner, one comes across umpteen challenges that could impact BRICS’s future trajectory in the global geopolitical landscape.

First and foremost, the internal asymmetries and divergences within BRICS constitute a major stumbling block. India and China are the primary adversaries within the grouping, with a historical rivalry rooted in the boundary dispute. They fought a major war in 1962, resulting in an embarrassing defeat for India. Since then, there have been several skirmishes and stand-offs; however, relations worsened after the 2020 Galwan stand-off, in which 20 Indian soldiers lost their lives. Although 24 rounds of negotiations have since taken place, bilateral ties remain tense, in a state of limbo, dominated by mistrust.

In trade and economic terms, India faces a massive trade deficit with China, much to the chagrin of its policymakers, and this rivalry has now taken on a geopolitical dimension. India opposes China’s CPEC (a part of the BRI), as it passes through Pakistan-occupied Kashmir, a territory claimed by India. Chinese workers and engineers are frequently attacked by Baloch rebels, allegedly with Indian support. China’s investments and presence in Pakistan’s Gwadar port are seen as a threat by India, which has responded by developing the Chabahar port in Iran. India aims to counter China’s BRI with initiatives like IMEC and the INSTC.

Though New Delhi lags significantly behind Beijing in Comprehensive National Power and lacks the capability to outsmart China’s expanding geostrategic and geoeconomic influence, it is unsettled by China’s robust strategic footprint across Africa, the South Caucasus, the Americas, and South Asia. India’s options are further constrained by China’s strategic encirclement of India through deepening relations with Nepal, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Bhutan, the Maldives, and Afghanistan.

In the Maldives, Bhutan, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, and Nepal, the two countries engage in a ‘cold war’ as they compete for influence over elections, political setups, and economic stakeholders. To counter China’s expansionist ambitions, India occasionally aligns with Indo-Pacific strategies, which only heighten Chinese insecurities. Conversely, China prefers to keep India preoccupied with internal security issues, attempting to divert its focus from the Indian Ocean by supporting Pakistan and its proxies.

India and Russia: Emerging Frictions

India and Russia share a civilisational friendship. During the Cold War, the two countries were like allies. Soviet Russia supported India in the 1971 war. However, in today’s world, Russia is uneasy about India’s robust ties with the United States. Like China, Russia is uncomfortable with the US’s engagement in Asia through the Indo-Pacific framework, which Moscow and Beijing view as an “Asian NATO”. The strengthening of Russia-China relations further strains the bilateral equation between Moscow and New Delhi, and these fault lines have only widened after the Ukraine war and the Israel-Hamas conflict.

Following the Ukraine war, Russia’s need for allies has grown, increasing its reliance on China. In a thoughtful remark, Professor Alexander Dugin suggested that, in the event of an India-China conflict, Moscow cannot afford to side with India at the expense of its ties with China. Although India has resisted Western pressure by purchasing Russian oil in defiance of sanctions over the Ukraine conflict, the two countries do not align on a range of issues in the Middle East. India’s strong defence partnership with Israel contrasts with Russia’s support for Iran and Lebanon, highlighting divergent choices.

India and China are also on opposing sides in the West Asian conflict. Recently, China hosted Hamas leadership, whereas India has firmly expressed its support for Israel’s fight against terrorism, even as New Delhi continues to advocate a two-state solution. Islamist groups like Hamas and Hezbollah maintain ties with anti-India Islamist groups operating within India, posing a serious security threat. Furthermore, both Russia and China have friendly ties with the Taliban, which poses a major internal and external security threat for India. Anti-India terrorist groups such as Jaish and Lashkar have close connections with the Taliban.

While these differences may not appear critical at this stage, they are likely to become more significant and could strain bilateral ties in the future. Additionally, Russia’s strengthening ties with Pakistan, Turkey, and Azerbaijan will likely be a cause for concern. If a global conflict were to arise, Russia and India could potentially find themselves on opposing sides.

Russia-China Fault lines

The discussion of BRICS’s internal asymmetries would be incomplete without addressing Russia-China fault lines. Although both countries are currently aligned against the West, with China supporting Russia in the Ukraine war, they have a history of mutual distrust and military confrontations. They vie for influence in Central Asia. China’s growing strategic and geoeconomic footprint in Central Asia and Eurasia makes Russia sceptical. Additionally, the ambiguity surrounding China’s relations with the West remains a source of concern.

Despite geopolitical tensions, strong trade and economic ties persist between the United States, Europe, and China. Amid the ongoing strain over the Ukraine war, senior members of the US administration continue to visit China. Even regarding Taiwan, the US maintains an ambivalent stance. Thus, Russia’s alliance with China appears to be more tactical than enduring. Several strategic experts in India believe that Russia requires India to help counter and contain China.

BRICS and the Global South

Representing and strengthening the Global South is central to the BRICS agenda. Through institutions like the New Development Bank, BRICS offers an alternative to the hegemonic and exploitative Bretton Woods system. However, even within this domain, underlying geopolitical rivalries remain significant.

India and China compete to lead the Global South. China, with its history of supporting anti-imperial freedom movements in Asia and Africa, its economic influence, and its civilisational state identity, strongly asserts its claim to this leadership. India, with its historical role as a leading figure in the Non-Aligned Movement, also aspires to lead the Global South, intending to use this alliance to counter China’s expansionist designs and global agenda. Additionally, within BRICS, India seeks to strengthen the sub-group of India, Brazil, and South Africa to counterbalance China.

For other BRICS members like Brazil and South Africa, the challenge lies in navigating the rivalry between New Delhi and Beijing. Moreover, Beijing’s expanding global economic footprint, characterised by trade, investment, and large-scale infrastructure and connectivity projects, raises concerns worldwide. For example, in South America, Brazil has temporarily lost the South American market of manufacturing goods to China. Additionally, resistance to Chinese projects has erupted in various African and Asian countries, with locals voicing concerns over the exploitation of natural resources, job losses, and labour rights abuses.

In Balochistan, a violent separatist movement has emerged as a major threat to CPEC. China’s so-called “debt-trap diplomacy” and controversial lending practices, aimed at exploiting financial distress for its economic and geostrategic aims, have led to economic collapse, political instability, and widespread opposition in countries like Sri Lanka, Zambia, and Pakistan. Furthermore, China’s support for dictatorial regimes raises significant questions about its credibility.

At the 15^th BRICS summit in June 2023, the group expanded to include Egypt, Ethiopia, Saudi Arabia, Iran, and the UAE. With this expansion, BRICS now includes the world’s top six oil-producing countries. However, future expansion is unlikely to be a smooth process. Aligning the values of dictatorial and Islamist regimes like Saudi Arabia and Iran with democratic countries such as India, Brazil, and South Africa will be a challenge. Additionally, further expansion could make consensus-based decision-making, a hallmark of BRICS, increasingly difficult.

Reportedly, around 40 countries from the Global South are interested in joining BRICS. However, there is currently no structured or systematic policy for expansion. For its central powers like India, Russia, and China, the expansion will likely be driven by efforts to strengthen their influence. For instance, Russia may seek to bolster its position in Eurasia and Central Asia. Similarly, India and China will likely compete in future expansions to solidify their claims to leadership of the Global South.

As for the Global South itself, a pertinent question arises: Is the Global South a reality or a myth? The so-called entity of the Global South is an ensemble of functional and partly functional underdeveloped democracies, failed states, authoritarian regimes, Islamist regimes, and states fractured by terrorist actors. It is not a unified entity with a common global vision. There are intra-group rivalries and wars. That said, achieving a shared global vision for the Global South may be an unattainable goal.

Finally, within BRICS, there are clear divisions regarding its broader vision. China and Russia pursue an uncompromisingly anti-West stance, aiming to challenge Western hegemony and use BRICS as a tool to establish a new world order. However, India, Brazil, and South Africa represent a non-Western rather than explicitly anti-Western segment. They prefer to promote change within the existing global security and economic architecture.

In considering BRICS’s challenges, the discussion would be incomplete without analysing India’s stakes and future role in shaping multipolar world order initiatives like BRICS.

Despite India’s aspirations as a rising economic power, it faces significant internal challenges that may impede its rise. Foremost among these is internal security. Communal polarisation is at an all-time high, with Islamic extremism posing a severe threat to national stability. It can be argued that India is sitting on a ticking time bomb, as current communal tensions could potentially escalate into a nationwide civil conflict. In the Northeast, tribal unrest and separatist movements—allegedly supported by foreign powers—have heightened India’s insecurities. The recent regime change in Bangladesh and the resurgence of Islamists have worsened the situation, creating potential safe havens for anti-India elements in the Northeast.

In the economic domain, India is often compared with China; however, the differences are glaring. India continues to be ruled by an outdated bureaucracy and an ailing democratic system. Poor governance structures, inadequate infrastructure, and a deteriorating education system do not bode well for India’s future growth.

To conclude, it can be said that BRICS, in its geopolitical avatar, presents a robust alternative to Western hegemony. As a harbinger of a future multipolar world order, it plays a significant role in the ongoing global power shift. However, internal frictions limit its impact and growth. Moreover, the risk of escalation in current conflicts and the potential emergence of new conflict zones suggest a rapid progression towards global conflict, which severely restricts the shift to multipolarity through peaceful, diplomatic platforms like BRICS. Hence, BRICS may be sidelined in an increasingly violent world where gun battles are being resorted to decide most of the issues. Nonetheless, it will be instrumental in shaping the post-conflict global landscape.

Disclaimer: This paper is the author's individual scholastic contribution and does not necessarily reflect the organization's viewpoint. The article was first published in News18.