Chabahar Port: A Triumph in Strategic Autonomy

The discussion pertains to the recent agreement between India and Iran regarding the Chabahar Port. It also delves into the strategic significance of this achievement for India, particularly in light of the prevailing Western sanctions on Iran.

Chabahar Port: A Triumph in Strategic Autonomy

Explainer

By: Shubhi Sharma 

Earlier this month, the Minister of State of the Ministry of Ports, Shipping and Waterways in India, Sarbananda Sonowal, formalized a decade-long agreement with Iran concerning the Chabahar port. The agreement was established between India Ports Global Ltd. (IPGL) and the Port and Maritime Organization (PMO) of Iran. In accordance with the pact, IPGL is set to inject approximately $120 million into the Shahid Beheshti Port in Chabahar for developmental and operational purposes. India has also committed to extending a credit line of $250 million to further enhance the port's infrastructure. This new agreement supersedes the 2016 pact, which was initiated subsequent to Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visit to Iran. Under the previous pact, India had pledged a $500 million investment in the Shahid Beheshti terminal, which commenced operations in 2018 following investments from IPGL. However, due to the annual renewal requirement of the 2016 pact, businesses and shipping entities were apprehensive about utilizing the port. The newly established agreement, which provides a more enduring solution, holds significant importance for India's national interests owing to the port's strategic location.

The Chabahar Port, situated in southeastern Iran on the Gulf of Oman, comprises two ports – Shahid Beheshti and Shahid Kalantari. This port, located on the Makran coast of the Baluchistan province, is the sole Iranian port directly accessible from the Indian Ocean. Due to its proximity to Afghanistan and Central Asian countries, it is often referred to as the "Golden Gate" for these landlocked nations. Its unique location, a mere 550 nautical miles from Kandla Port in Gujarat, provides India with the opportunity to reach Central Asian countries, Afghanistan, and Europe while bypassing the risks associated with the land route through Pakistan.

The Chabahar Port agreement was initially proposed during the tenure of former Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee. However, the project gained momentum in 2015 following the signing of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) between Iran and P5+1 nations (USA, UK, France, Russia, China, and Germany). The JCPOA aimed to restrict Iran's nuclear program in exchange for relief from sanctions.The Chabahar project received a boost with the signing of the tripartite agreement between India, Iran and Afghanistan to develop a transport-and-trade corridor. It consists of a road network which goes up to Zaranj in Afghanistan, then a 218 km road from Zaranj to Delaram, an early investment by India and will provide access to four major cities in Afghanistan – Herat, Kandahar, Mazar-e-sharif and Kabul. This road network will also provide India with access to the resource rich Central Asian countries and will reduce the time taken to transport goods by a third.

The significance of the Port lies in its connection to the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC), which serves as a vital link between India and Russia through Iran. This connection substantially reduces transportation time and provides a secure supply chain. This is particularly crucial due to the escalating energy trade between India and Russia.The INSTC spans over 7,200 km in sea, rail and road route and so far, has been ratified by 13 countries. The INSTC will significantly reduce transit time and will also decrease the freight charges by around 30 percent compared to the Suez Canal route which is often in the midst of regional conflicts.

The strategic significance of Chabahar Port is underscored by its proximity, just 170 km east of Gwadar Port in Pakistan. This location provides China with assertive access to the Indian Ocean. Chabahar Port serves as a means for India to monitor the activities of Pakistan and China in the Persian Gulf. Furthermore, it enables India to counterbalance China's expanding influence in the Indian Ocean, particularly in response to its String of Pearls strategy. India's utilization of Chabahar Port and the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC) reflects a bold approach aimed at enhancing trade connectivity with Central Asia. This approach also prioritizes territorial integrity and sovereignty, setting it apart from China's Belt and Road initiative.The recent agreement has raised concerns in the United States due to the imposition of approximately 600 sanctions on Iranian entities. Historically, the US has imposed sanctions on India only twice, in 1974 and 1998, following India's nuclear tests. India's stance on unilateral sanctions is that they are not recognized unless approved by the United Nations. However, India has adhered to the US-imposed sanctions on Iran thus far. In 2018, India successfully advocated for sanctions relief from the US for its involvement in a port near Afghanistan, which was strategically important to the US at the time. However, due to shifting priorities and Iran's support of terrorist groups like Hamas in Palestine and Houthis in Yemen, the US has since imposed additional sanctions on Iran.

Certainly, India and the United States currently maintain a strong bilateral relationship, making it improbable for the US to levy substantial sanctions on India, with the exception of targeted sanctions on specific entities associated with the Chabahar Port. Furthermore, the recent ratification of the 10-year agreement represents a significant achievement for India's strategic objectives, facilitating the establishment of more resilient supply chains and enhanced connectivity to the Central Asian region, Russia, the Middle East, and Europe amidst persisting regional conflicts.

Disclaimer: This paper is the author's individual scholastic contribution and does not necessarily reflect the organization's viewpoint.