India Must Prepare for a Final Showdown with Pakistan: Another War Coming Soon

Analysis

By Dr. Abhinav Pandya 

After facing an embarrassing rout by the Indian armed forces in Operation Sindoor, Pakistan has focused its efforts on spreading a fabricated and false anti-India global narrative. Supported by its allies like Turkey, China, Azerbaijan, and Western media, Pakistan is making desperate efforts to compensate for its battlefield losses by spreading lies. However, as the evidence is emerging, Pakistan’s lies are getting exposed. Amidst these smokescreens, it is imperative to make a realistic assessment of India’s gains and losses.

Measuring India’s Successes and Shortcomings

Unlike in the Balakot air raids, Indian armed forces did not leave any room for raising questions about the efficacy of Operation Sindoor. Operation Sindoor’s success resulted in the destruction of the crucial terror infrastructure at nine sites in Pakistan. The lethal missile attacks neutralised 100-plus hardcore terrorists. Ten family members of JeM chief Masood Azhar were killed in the Bahalwalpur complex.  Since Jaish is mostly run by Masood’s family, with different members taking care of different wings of the organisation, like a typical ‘family enterprise,’ the loss of ten members can be devastating. Reportedly, Mufti Rauf Azgar, Jaish operational commander and Maulana Masood Azhar’s brother, was killed, but his death has not been confirmed yet. Mufti Rauf Azhar’s death can be a shattering blow to Jaish as he supervised the operational matters of JeM, such as training, finances, recruitment, infiltration, and planning and executing fidayeen attacks in India. Masood’s brother-in-law, Yusuf Azhar, in charge of weapons training and the mastermind of several terror plots in Kashmir, also died. He was the de facto chief of JeM, as Masood takes care of strategic and outreach matters. The other high-value targets include Hafiz Mohammad, a Jaish cadre, and Abu Akasha, LeT’s central committee member at Muridke. Mohammad Hasan Khan, son of the Jaish operational commander, Mufti Asghar Khan Kashmiri, also died. Neutralisation of terrorist commanders and the terror infrastructure is likely to weaken their capacity to run the terror machinery in Kashmir.

Secondly, Pakistan’s links with terrorist organisations are out in the open. Following the attack on terror camps, there was a barrage of images showing Pakistan army generals and senior police officers attending the funerals of deceased terrorists. In one of the images, the senior army generals are standing behind Hafiz Abdur Rauf, the US-designated global terrorist and LeT commander, offering funeral prayers.

Thirdly, India’s conventional superiority is firmly established. The swiftness and precision with which India destroyed terror camps, military installations, and Pakistan’s air bases proved that there is no match to India. Chinese HQ 9 air defense systems proved to be an abject failure. The Indian four-layered air defense systems intercepted Pakistani missiles and drones. Indian indigenous weapons like Akash and Brahmos, and Russian S400, effectively thwarted Pakistan’s projectiles. India emerges as an exemplar military leader, inflicting a crushing defeat on its nuclear-armed adversary in a short and swift war of four days, without getting caught in a long-drawn low-intensity war trap, akin to the Russia-Ukraine situation.

India missiles hit the Nur Khan base, close to the Nuclear Command Center and the entrance gates of Pakistan’s nuclear storage facilities in Sargodha complex, disabling Pakistani forces from accessing their nukes hidden deep in the underground complex. The open-source intelligence lends credence to such unverified rumours. Reportedly, the US sent Beechcraft B350 AMS, a specialised aircraft designed to detect radioactive leaks, map nuclear fallouts, and render support during radiological events. Many unverified sources mentioned Egyptian transport place EGY2016 shipping boron to Pakistan, an element used to contain radioactive leaks. However, neither India nor Pakistan has confirmed strikes on nuclear facilities. Air warfare historian Tim Cooper suggests a ‘clear-cut victory’ for India. He argues that India’s attack on Pakistan’s nuclear storage facilities demonstrates its confidence in thwarting Pakistan’s nuclear retaliation, speaking volumes about India’s capabilities.

Pakistan’s conventional weaknesses and vulnerabilities stand exposed. The lack of strategic depth renders all the cities of Pakistan vulnerable to Indian missiles. Hostile Afghan Taliban, TTP, and Baluchi rebels can make Pakistan’s situation pathetic in the event of a full-scale war with India. In the absence of a robust air defense system, Pakistani forces will not survive long against their adversary. Once their air defenses crumble, Indian missiles can flatten Pakistan in no time. On the borders, Indian artillery and superior firepower can rout Pakistani forces, following which India’s infantry can march into Pakistani territory. Pakistani must ask this question to their Turkish and Chinese benefactors- will they send their ground troops to fight Indian forces?

Discussing India’s shortcomings in Operation Sindoor is crucial to prevent casualties and failures in the future. Firstly, India retaliated 14 days after the Pahalgam terrorist attack. This gap resonated with lofty and aggressive claims to seek revenge. Against the backdrop of the 2019 Balakot strike, Pakistan realised early that Indian retaliation was coming, and it got sufficient time to prepare. Reportedly, Pakistan shut down 1000 madrasas in the PoK around May 2 or 3.  Additionally, in those 14 days, policy paralysis, confusion, and perhaps a well-designed sabotage prevailed in the decision-making circles to prevaricate and mislead the political leadership. Reportedly, the bureaucrat-and-police heavy national security and diplomatic set-up backed by its think-tank ecosystem advised against any retaliatory kinetic action, citing real or fabricated fears of spiralling into a low-intensity war trap and a nuclear reprisal amidst highly tense bilateral ties. They were gung-ho about the abeyance of the Indus Waters Treaty decision; however, the measure without a robust kinetic action would have served no purpose because India does not have the required infrastructure to divert the Indus water into the Indian territory. Finally, after intense and gruelling debates, India decided to go in for a proportionate, calibrated, adequate, and measured response, targeting only the terror infrastructure and deliberately avoiding the military installations and civilians. However, contrary to India’s intelligence assessments, Pakistan responded with a disproportionate retaliation, killing civilians and targeting military infrastructure. Pakistan army launched an all-out offensive on the entire Indian Western border, short of sending its fighter jets into the Indian territory. Indian authorities expected Pakistan to react along the lines of the post-Balakot response, i.e., a localised attack along the LoC. Possibly, attacks on Bahawalpur and Muridke complex unnerved and rattled General Asim Muneer, desperate to resuscitate himself in Pakistan’s fractious army by teaching India a tough lesson. Reasonably, failures in strategic forecasting and assessment might have led to some losses in the air combat on May 7; however, after that, the Indian armed forces did a course correction and destroyed their air defenses before sending barrages of missiles and drones and inflicting heavy damage.

As regards Pakistan’s unexpected retaliation, it can be argued that Pakistan’s intent was dubious, and the reaction was not spontaneous. Given that India retaliated with Balakot airstrikes after Pulwama, it was clear to Pakistan that any future terror attack would be responded to with heavy use of force. Having known this, if Pakistan sanctioned the Pahalgam attack, it can be stated that they deliberately planned this war. Their motives can be debated. Either they wanted to unite the public opinion due to rising discontentment against the army amidst intensifying Baloch and TTP movements, or salvage the army’s credibility due to its growing unpopularity in the Imran Khan issue, or test India’s red lines.  Internationalising the Kashmir issue and rejuvenating Pakistan’s waning presence in Kashmir due to the robust tourism growth could also have been their objective. Some other intelligence assessments suggest that the Pahalgam attack was also aimed at disturbing communal harmony in India and damaging PM Modi’s credibility. Further, Pakistan’s drone and missile attacks were possibly intended to size up India’s capabilities, identify its weaknesses and strengths, and test India’s air defenses to plan and execute something bigger later.

The unexpected ceasefire met with severe criticism from various quarters. Many former army generals said that once again India repeated its history of sacrificing victory when it is too close, as happened in 1947, 1965, 1971, and the 1999 Kargil conflict. Eminent strategic analyst Brahma Chellaney suggested that India did not gain much by destroying terror camps because they can be rebuilt as long as the Pakistan army, the entity behind the terror infrastructure, remains functional. Aptly summarizing the ceasefire, he said that India snatched defeat from the jaws of victory. General public opinion and several experts criticized the ceasefire as a lost opportunity to destroy the Pakistan army, get back PoK, and disintegrate Pakistan. In effect, they expected India to escalate and move its ground forces into PoK. However, this needs to be analyzed in the immediate context. India never planned or intended to attack Pakistan. Its early response to terror camps was measured, adequate, and proportionate, clearly signalling that New Delhi did not intend to escalate. Though the social media discourse and India’s public intellectuals had engaged in a hyper-nationalistic frenzy, passionately ramped up the idea of conquering PoK and disintegrating Pakistan. Baloch and TTP attacks claiming high casualty figures further emboldened them; however, in the top echelons of political leadership, and the intelligence, defense, and diplomatic set-up, there was hardly any talk of India even visualising an offensive to bring back PoK. The RSS ideologue and a leading strategic expert, Mr Gurumurthy, known for his proximity to India’s top political leadership and security czars, said that the operation Sindoor had no endgame like winning back PoK.

Operation Sindoor’s prime objective was to bring justice to the victims of the Pahalgam terror attack, not to conquer territory. Its essence was symbolic, i.e., hitting the terror camps hard and signalling a strong message to Pakistan.

On the diplomacy front, India faces a disturbing situation. In this war, expectedly, Turkey and China firmly supported Pakistan with weapons and diplomacy. Pakistan used Chinese jets, air defense systems, and Turkish loitering munitions. In West Asia, Israel unequivocally supported India. India used Israeli Herop drones against Pakistan. The Gulf nations’ stand was more measured than before, when there used to be a distinct pro-Pakistan tilt. UAE showed a conspicuous pro-India diplomatic stance in condemnation of the Pahalgam attack; however, Abu Dhabi was critical of the abeyance of the Indus Waters treaty and voted in Pakistan’s favour in the IMF voting on extending a loan to Pakistan. Hence, its support was not unequivocal. Other West Asian countries like Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Oman, and Iran officially maintained strict neutrality and called for de-escalation. However, they expressed solidarity with Pakistan on the common religious identity.  Reportedly, Iran and Saudi foreign ministers shuttled between their capitals and New Delhi to resolve the conflict; however, their trips have remained under the radar, smoothly escaping media scrutiny! The OIC, which includes India’s friends like Saudi Arabia, in its official statement expressing concern over the deteriorating security situation in South Asia, cited India’s ‘unfounded allegations’ as the main reason behind the escalation. Kremlin condemned terrorism but was not forthcoming in supporting India, as expected. Expressing deep concern over the conflict escalation, Russia called for exercising restraint and a peaceful resolution. Initially, the US kept a non-interventionist approach and gave India a free hand; however, by May 10, the US pressured India to cease fire. Perhaps, the much-talked-about attack on Pakistan’s nuclear storage facilities, allegedly housing the American nuclear assets, unnerved Washington.  The US-mediated ceasefire seems to have brought Pakistan closer to the US and paved the way for internationalizing the Kashmir issue. However, India categorically denied the role of the US in the ceasefire, stating that Kashmir is a bilateral issue. Nevertheless, Donald Trump’s eagerness to mediate in the Kashmir issue and hobnobbing with Islamist Pakistan, Turkey, and Qatar raises several questions about America’s future diplomatic and military stance in the event of another war between the nuclear adversaries.

Conclusion

First and foremost, Modi emerges as a national hero capable of leading India in a major war-like situation and navigating through global diplomatic challenges. For a long time, Modi’s image in popular opinion had taken a hit, with ordinary Indian citizens and particularly his core Hindu constituency viewing him as soft and indecisive on terror and Islamic extremism, under the influence of his bureaucrat-heavy national security and diplomatic set-up. However, in this conflict, Modi appears to have come out with his true self, empowered the armed forces by giving them a free hand, and led the country towards a decisive victory.

Pakistan, driven by its pathological hatred for India, rooted in its jihadist mindset, is unlikely to abate terror activities. Reportedly, in the recent conflict, more than 50 terrorists have infiltrated into Indian Kashmir under the cover of LoC firing. With a friendly Bangladesh, GHQ Rawalpindi can infiltrate saboteurs from the porous Bangladesh border. Having tested India’s resolve and capabilities in a direct conflict, Pakistan is likely to orchestrate fidayeen attacks in J&K and other parts of India. Besides, they can also create communal disturbances because of intensifying Hindu-Muslim polarisation in India. Internally, such fidayeens and terrorists can hamper troop movements, conduct fidayeens near the military convoys, and contaminate water and food supplies.

India’s new doctrine on terror explicitly states that terror attacks will be considered an act of war. Given that India will have to militarily respond. In all likelihood, Pakistan will use such pretexts to provoke India and engage in a full-scale war. Assured support of China and Turkey will encourage Pakistan. Additionally, Islamabad can get firm support from the Islamic world and terror groups. India needs to be prepared for a scenario where China and Bangladesh open a front on their borders during the India-Pakistan war. It will be challenging for India to get meaningful and substantial global diplomatic support. Hence, India needs to scale up its diplomatic heft towards external balancing. Russia can be a critical link in managing China and getting an uninterrupted supply of crucial weapons during wartime.

In PM Modi’s words, the Operation Sindoor remains suspended. Indus Waters Treat continues to be in abeyance. Mistrust prevails on both sides. Gloves are off. Any small spark can lead to the unleashing of missiles and drones into each other’s territory. South Asia remains extremely volatile, militarised, and dangerous. Hence, India must deliberate and prepare for a final and full-scale conventional war with Pakistan. The use of nuclear weapons cannot be ruled out. Strategically, India is not left with many choices to ensure stability and peace in South Asia, except aiming towards a robust solution for its Pakistan problem, and that is the disintegration of Pakistan. That said, India does not have much time. It cannot wait until Pakistan acquires advanced stealth capabilities, robust air defense systems, and loitering munitions. With Field Marshal Asim Muneer in power, Islamabad is likely to invest heavily to acquire all these capabilities as early as possible. Arguably, if South Asia faces another major conflict between the two nuclear-armed adversaries in the next three to four months or later, it should not surprise anyone.

Disclaimer: This paper is the author's individual scholastic contribution and does not necessarily reflect the organization's viewpoint.