Leaping towards a New Indo-Pacific?

Analysis

By Angana Guha Roy 

On June 6 last year when US State Department Spokesperson of the erstwhile Biden administration said that the White House works with India on a free, secure, prosperous Indo- Pacific and it will continue to be their priority little did anybody predict the looming shift in US foreign policy with Trump’s unpredicted return to power. The world is adapting to the Trump era. Countries are calibrating efforts, action, & rhetoric to get on with the new reality that ‘MAGA-MAGA’ entails.

The landscape of the Indo-Pacific under Trump 2.0 is a difficult read. Whether Trump’s enhanced tariff card will impact hard power dynamics with its allies is yet to be revealed. A renewed or more importantly “reduced emphasis” on alliance partnership in the western pacific will presumably lead to a rearranged roadmap for the first island chain defence based on the US prolonged strategy of ‘war on contingent’, a defence line arrangement among the alliance partners to counter China’s influence in the strategic waters. After resuming office, Trump’s China-related statements pivot intensively around tariffs.  Further, Trump’s transactional take on Taiwan’s defence gives conflicting indications about the sincerity of the US in the region in countering Chinese influence.

Meanwhile, amidst the internal political crisis that roils US alliance partners in the region, like the impeachment and arrest of South Korean President Yoon Sook Yeol and the low approval ratings of Japanese PM Shigeru Ishiba, China, Japan, and South Korea have agreed to jointly respond to the US tariffs.

However, it's too early to conclude the emergence of a fractured Indo-Pacific.  In a reassuring tone, US Defence Secretary Pete Hegseth in a recent statement decrypted “America first” as not “America alone”. He called Japan’s role as indispensable in countering “aggressive” China in America’s prioritised ‘Pacific Pivot’. Reportedly, Hegeth made a “little-noticed announcement” at the start of the trip that “points” to another priority for the second Trump administration's Indo-Pacific strategy: bolstering the "second island chain. "Given that the Trump administration’s determined withdrawal from the long-standing Euro Atlantic order will leave much room for the US to focus on Indo Pacific now, there is no clarity yet on the scale of continuity/ recaliberation of operational commands of stakeholder countries in the security gamut.

As the future of European security hangs in the balance with high possibilities of Europe negotiating or streamlining chokepoints of the security dilemma with Russia, the Indo-Pacific too hasn't seen much progress in setting a tone for the future strategic direction under the Trump administration. In fact, conjectures about a recalibrated security order are high on prediction. PM Narendra Modi’s recent comments on Sino-India relationship in a podcast with Lex Friedman indicated a possible shift towards rapprochement in Sino- Indian bilateral ties. During the podcast, Modi emphasized that India and China should engage in a "healthy and natural" competition while ensuring that differences do not escalate into disputes. He also highlighted the deep historical ties between the two nations and underscored the need for dialogue over discord.

Meanwhile, Trump’s trade blitzkrieg and extreme emphasis on economic diplomacy might factorize- the US-China grand bargain dialogue is expected to happen soon this year. Subjected to unpredictability, the trajectory of US-China bilateral ties in the following months will also determine the binary of functional security architecture in the Indo-Pacific. A wider gap in the trade ties presumably will ensure a more hawkish stance of the US towards China.

Earlier in February, Trump signed a National Security Presidential Memorandum ( NSPM) directing the Committee on CFIUS to restrict China-affiliated investors from investing in technology, critical infrastructure, healthcare, agriculture, energy, raw materials, & other strategic sectors in the US. The memorandum categorically mentioned that foreign adversaries, including China, systematically direct and facilitate investment in US companies and assets to obtain cutting-edge technologies, intellectual property and leverage in strategic studies. The memo calls for restricting the purchase of farmland and real estate near sensitive facilities.

Critics argue that a tightened economic and security policy under Trump will create more room for China to posture itself as an alternative or reliable voice in the Global South or even leverage its capabilities in a revised security order marking a walled withdrawal of US supremacy.

The most fundamental point in this scenario would be to reassess the role of QUAD and the future of AUKUS, the trilateral partnership between Australia, the UK, and the US. The Philippines has already asked India to join a new military ‘SQUAD’ along with the US, Australia, and Japan to counter threats in the Indo-Pacific.

A renewed world order under Trump 2.0 might harden each country's position on strategic autonomy, downplaying the conventions and accountability that govern the commonality of shared interests, shared threats and shared future. One might ask, are we leaping towards a new Indo-Pacific?

Disclaimer: This paper is the author's individual scholastic contribution and does not necessarily reflect the organization's viewpoint.