State Complicity in the Shia Massacres in Pakistan’s Kurram

Analysis

By Arun Anand 

On November 23, a heavily fortified convoy of around 200 vehicles, carrying Shia pilgrims from Peshawar to the mountainous Kurram district in Pakistan’s Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province, was audaciously ambushed by Sunni extremists in broad daylight within the Sunni-majority Lower Kurram area. This meticulously planned assault, as reported by various media outlets, resulted in a devastating toll, claiming the lives of 45 individuals, including women and children, while leaving many others severely injured. The Friday massacre, which underscores the rising sectarian violence in the region, was followed by the execution of an additional 18 Shia men in the Bagan area of the district.

These nearly sixty fatalities highlight the ongoing and systemic persecution of the Shia minority by the Sunni majority in Pakistan, with the Kurram district emerging as a central hub of anti-Shia sectarian violence. A brief examination of the inability of Pakistan’s federal and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa provincial authorities to address this unabated rise in violence against the Shia community reveals a concerning complicity in their support for Sunni extremist groups in the area, a factor often neglected in mainstream discussions. Since July, Kurram district has been on high alert due to repeated incidents of sectarian violence targeting Shia individuals, which began as a land dispute but has escalated into a full-scale sectarian conflict. Over this timeframe, more than 150 Shia individuals have lost their lives in this relentless violence perpetrated by Sunni tribes in collaboration with extremist groups.

Two significant factors set Kurram apart from other districts in the region. The first is its geographical positioning, bordered by Afghanistan on three sides, with Nangarhar to the north, Khost to the south, and Paktika to the west, while Orakzai district lies to the east within Pakistan. The second factor is its demographic makeup, characterized by sectarian diversity, with Shia Muslims comprising about 45% of its population of over 800,000. For example, tribes such as the Turis and Bangash, primarily residing in Upper Kurram, follow Shia Islam, whereas other tribes like Zaimusht, Mangal, Muqbal, Masuzai, and Parachamkani, along with some segments of the Bangash tribe in Central and Lower Kurram, adhere to Sunni Islam.

The intersection of geographical proximity to Afghanistan and sectarian diversity has made Kurram a precarious sectarian hotspot, a shift largely influenced by Pakistan’s state policies. The roots of this volatility can be traced back to the aftermath of the US invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, during which the Pakistani military actively facilitated the movement of the Afghan Taliban across the border as American forces ousted the Sunni conservative group’s unrecognized Islamist regime. Concurrently, the Pakistani state mobilized domestic extremist factions, cultivated throughout the 1980s and 1990s, to bolster the Taliban’s insurgency against US troops, effectively turning its border districts along the Durand Line, including Kurram, into operational bases for these groups.

During this period, Kurram experienced the infiltration of Sunni sectarian groups such as Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (now known as Ahl-e-Sunnat-Wal-Jamaat) and Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ), both ideologically rooted in vehement anti-Shia sentiments. Notably, rather than banning these groups or at least limiting their influence, the Pakistani state and mainstream political parties, including the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N), provided them with tacit support. These anti-Shia sectarian factions were strategically relocated from Punjab to Kurram, serving the dual purpose of reducing their destabilizing impact in Punjab while harnessing their electoral and militant capabilities. This deliberate facilitation not only solidified sectarian divisions in Kurram but also highlighted the state’s complicity in utilising extremist actors for political and strategic ends.

Since then, the region has remained in a state of constant turmoil, characterised by recurring incidents of sectarian violence directed at Shia tribes. Sunni sectarian groups have effectively exploited Kurram’s sectarian divides, leveraging even seemingly minor issues, such as land disputes, to heighten tensions. These groups have strategically aligned themselves with Sunni tribal factions in local disputes, thereby intensifying sectarian hostilities. A notable example is the aftermath of the 2007 mosque attack in Parachinar, where a Sunni gunman killed 40 Shia men. Following this, Sunni sectarian extremists obstructed the district’s only major highway that links Parachinar to Peshawar, the provincial capital of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. This blockade, which persisted for nearly four years, effectively isolated the Shia community, compelling them to undertake perilous and arduous journeys through Afghanistan’s provinces of Khost, Nangarhar, and Paktika, as well as Kabul, to travel between Kurram and Peshawar.

In the current wave of violence, it is the stubbornness of Sunni sectarian extremist groups, rather than the Sunni tribes themselves, that has emerged as the primary driver of ongoing sectarian conflict. This sectarian intransigence has severely undermined the effectiveness of traditional conflict-resolution methods, such as the Jirga, which, despite facilitating multiple ceasefires, have failed to quell the unrest. The state’s abdication of its duty to maintain law and order has further exacerbated the situation, raising serious concerns about its commitment to protecting civilian lives and restoring stability in the region.

The enduring patronage that the Pakistan Army and major mainstream political parties extend to sectarian groups, driven by their conflicting interests, highlights a clear lack of commitment to implement meaningful measures aimed at restoring order and addressing the deteriorating security situation in the region. More troubling is that this tacit support indicates a disturbing complicity in perpetuating Kurram’s sectarian conflict. Consequently, unless the Pakistan Army and the political establishment decisively disassociate from these Sunni extremists, the Shia community will remain exposed to the ongoing atrocities perpetrated by these sectarian groups. In this context, the international community must exert pressure on the Pakistani government to tackle the volatile security situation in Kurram; failing that, stringent measures, including sanctions, should be contemplated to compel the authorities to take effective action to protect vulnerable populations.

Disclaimer: This paper is the author's individual scholastic contribution and does not necessarily reflect the organization's viewpoint.

The writer is a senior journalist and a distinguished fellow with Usanas Foundation. He has written more than a dozen books. His x handle is @ArunAnandLive