Islamic State Bengal’s resurgence: The re-emergence of an ISIS-linked militant architecture in Bangladesh

Analysis

By Salah Uddin Shoaib Choudhury

The recent explosion at a madrasa in Keraniganj, on the outskirts of Dhaka, may mark a critical turning point in South Asia’s evolving jihadist landscape. What authorities initially treated as an isolated blast has since revealed the alleged reconstitution of an ISIS-aligned militant structure operating under the banner of Islamic State Bengal (ISB). The reported declaration of a “Dhaka Regional Commander” signals not merely operational survival, but an attempt at structured territorial presence - raising urgent strategic concerns for Bangladesh and its regional partners.

According to explosive experts, the blast was caused by the accidental detonation of Triacetone Triperoxide (TATP) precursors and suicide vest components. TATP - highly sensitive to heat and friction - has long been a hallmark of ISIS-style bombmaking and differs significantly from the crude explosive devices historically used in local political violence in Bangladesh. Its presence indicates not only technical sophistication but also ideological alignment with transnational jihadist doctrine.

The emergence of a regional commander of ISIS

Credible intelligence assessments identify Sheikh Al Amin as the individual declared by ISB as its Dhaka Regional Commander. Al Amin had reportedly been living at the madrasa with his family for more than three years. What outwardly functioned as a small religious institution was, in reality, a sophisticated IED manufacturing and storage hub.

Prior to the explosion, Al Amin’s network allegedly relocated more than 85 improvised explosive devices to clandestine safe houses, creating what security analysts describe as a substantial kinetic threat ahead of Bangladesh’s February 12 parliamentary elections. This relocation effort suggests operational foresight, compartmentalization, and contingency planning - traits not typically associated with disorganized extremist cells.

According to media report, “Neo-Jama’atul Mujahedin Bangladesh (JMB)” is known as the local franchise of ISIS, while its kingpin, Salauddin alias Salehin, has been hiding in West Bengal in India for years. An official of the National Investigation Agency (NIA) told the media, “Salauddin also visited Tamil Nadu, Karnataka and Kerala to spread JMB’s network among Bangla-speaking labourers there. We arrested Jahidul Islam, a key suspect in the Khagragarh blast case, in Bengaluru in August 2018, and after interrogating him, we came to know Salauddin’s activities in south Indian states”.

While the JMB kingpin is continuing terrorist activities sitting in India, where Al Amin Sheikh is one of his commanders in Bangladesh. Al Amin Sheikh is also known by numerous nicknames and aliases, including Md Al Amin Sheikh, Rajib, Rajib Islam, Rajib Islam Sheikh, Islam Sheikh and just Sheikh.  Hailing from Sharulia village in the Mollarhat subdistrict of Bagerhat, southwestern Bangladesh, Al Amin grew up as the only son in a family with five sisters, and his early education was rooted in the traditional Qawmi [Koranic] madrassa. He completed the Higher Secondary Certificate (HSC) at a college in Mollarhat.

It may be mentioned here that Bagerhat district served as a strategic safe haven and logistical corridor for the Al Qaeda-aligned terrorist group, Jama’atul Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB), during the mid-2000s. While JMB has been working as the local franchise of Al Qaeda, its offshoot “Neo-JMB” formed an alliance with Islamic State (ISIS).

The naming of a regional commander marks a psychological and organizational shift. It signals that ISB is no longer merely an underground affiliate but is attempting to project structured authority and territorial relevance within Bangladesh.

From JMB to Neo-JMB to Islamic State Bengal 

The roots of this development lie in the historical evolution of jihadist networks in Bangladesh. Jama’atul Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB), founded in 1998 by Shaykh Abdur Rahman, originally sought to transform Bangladesh into a theocratic state. Its leadership, including Siddiqul Islam alias Bangla Bhai, reportedly had ideological exposure through Islamist student movements and transnational jihadist circuits. According to Wilson John, a Senior Fellow with Observer Research Foundation (ORF), top kingpins of JMB – Shaykh Abdur Rahman and Siddiqul Islam alias Bangla Bhai were members of Islami Chhatra Shibir (ICS), the student wing of Jamaat-e-Islami (JeI), during their college days. 

Over time, JMB splintered. One faction - commonly known as “Neo-JMB” - aligned itself with the Islamic State’s global ideology and operational model. This faction later rebranded in some circles as Islamic State Bengal (ISB), signaling both allegiance and ambition. 

Media reports have linked ISB to the 2016 Holey Artisan Bakery massacre in Dhaka, one of the deadliest terrorist attacks in Bangladesh’s history, which targeted foreign nationals and shocked the international community. Following that attack, the government led by Sheikh Hasina launched a sweeping counterterrorism crackdown that significantly degraded Neo-JMB’s operational capacity. Many leaders were killed or arrested, and cells were dismantled. 

Yet, as history repeatedly demonstrates, ideological movements rarely disappear entirely. They fragment, mutate, and re-emerge under altered political and security conditions. 

According to a Jamestown article, “JMB’s founder and spiritual leader Shaykh Abdur Rahman of Jamalpur district in Bangladesh studied at Madina University and worked as a translator and interpreter at the Saudi Embassy in Dhaka before traveling to Afghanistan to take part in jihad. He most likely followed in the footsteps of the 3,500-strong batch of recruits dispatched to terrorist training camps by Harkat-ul Jihad al Islami (HuJI), an Al Qaeda-friendly Deobandi group. His association with HuJI, widely regarded as Al Qaeda’s South Asia arm, could also be noted from his reported links with two foreign - likely Arab - trainers who came to Bangladesh in 1995 to train militants from the Bengali-related Rohingya, a Muslim ethnic group fighting for independence from Myanmar. Rohingyas formed the backbone of the Bangladeshi terror groups often known as the Bangladesh Taliban and had considerable presence in the Korgani town of Karachi, one of HuJI’s key operational headquarters from where it assisted Al Qaeda and other groups”. 

ISB commander Al Amin's trajectory 

Al Amin’s personal trajectory illustrates this mutation. Raised in Sharulia village in Bagerhat district, an area that historically served as a logistical corridor for militant networks, he received early education in Qawmi madrassas before completing higher secondary education. In my assessments, his radicalization may have begun during his student years and deepened through exposure to online ISIS propaganda. 

Following his recruitment into Neo-JMB, Al Amin reportedly underwent arms training and later took on responsibilities in recruitment and military instruction. In addition to jihadist indoctrination, Al Amin was given arms training by the group. He was later tasked with recruiting new members and providing them with arms training. Onwards Al Amin played various roles in ISB - ranging from military training to recruitment of new jihadists to ensure the survival of ISIS on the soil of Bangladesh. 

In July 2017, he was arrested by Bangladesh’s Rapid Action Battalion in Narayanganj while allegedly planning large-scale operations. Firearms and extremist materials were recovered at the time. 

However, incarceration did not neutralize his influence. Between 2017 and 2019, during his imprisonment in Kashimpur Central Jail, he reportedly built bridges between historically rival jihadist factions - namely the Al Qaeda-aligned JMB elements and ISIS-oriented Neo-JMB cadres. Rather than serving as a deterrent, prison became a networking platform. 

After a second arrest in 2021 and eventual release on bail in late 2022 or early 2023, which took place long before the mass-bail of Islamist militants under the interim regime led by Muhammad Yunus - Al Amin adopted a low-profile civilian lifestyle. He reportedly worked as an auto-rickshaw and ride-share driver - positions that allowed mobility, anonymity, and broad social contact. Investigators believe these roles served as operational cover while he rebuilt networks. 

A notable tactical evolution was the use of “family cells”. His wife and female associates allegedly assisted in logistics and recruitment, a model that enhances operational security by embedding militant activity within domestic settings less likely to arouse suspicion. 

Although police arrested at least eight individuals - mostly family members, relatives, and associates of Al Amin - following the December 2025 explosion at the ISB bomb-making hub, the Dhaka Regional Commander of Islamic State Bengal (ISB) remains on the run. According to credible sources, he is currently moving between madrassas in the Bangladesh-India border areas and attempting to reorganize his activities with the assistance of several jihadists, most of whom are reportedly hiding in various parts of West Bengal and India’s northeastern states. 

The madrasa as a dual-use hub 

The transformation of Ummal Qura International Madrasa into a clandestine bomb-making facility underscores a broader concern: the weaponization of legitimate religious spaces for militant purposes. Publicly, the madrasa functioned as a small religious school operating out of a rented building. Privately, investigators allege, it housed bomb-making materials, including TATP precursors and components linked to suicide devices. 

This dual-use model mirrors patterns seen in conflict zones where extremist groups exploit educational or charitable fronts as logistical bases. The use of a family residence within the same premises further complicated detection.

Funding mechanisms also reflect Islamic State methodology. ISB reportedly employed organized robberies under the doctrinal justification of al-Fai -appropriating wealth in the name of jihad. Unlike the earlier JMB, which relied heavily on donations and external funding, ISB appears to have favored aggressive criminal fundraising to maintain operational autonomy. 

Meanwhile, it may be mentioned here that in 2024, immediately after the installation of an illegal regime headed by Muhammad Yunus, a huge consignment of 40 tons of RDX and other explosives imported from Pakistan’s weapons industry had simply vanished from the Chittagong Post, as there was no recorded documentation in the relevant government departments, nor within the Bangladesh Army. Intelligence suggests that these deadly materials have been handed over to extremist groups such as JMB and Ansar al-Islam. Raw materials for making IED at the clandestine explosive making hub for Islamic State Bengal (ISB) inside Ummal Qura International Madrasa in the Hasnabad area near Dhaka city were of Pakistan origin, while a certain amount of Pakistan-made RDX was also found inside the madrasa. 

Cross-border dimensions 

The regional dimension of this threat cannot be ignored. Neo-JMB’s historical leadership includes individuals who operated from or transited through India. Notably, figures such as Salauddin alias Salehin have been reported to use safe havens in West Bengal and to extend networks into southern Indian states with Bangla-speaking migrant labor populations. 

The cross-border mobility between Bangladesh and India - particularly through porous border areas - creates a gray zone conducive to clandestine movement. If Al Amin is indeed seeking refuge or reorganizing activities near border madrassas, the implications extend beyond Bangladesh’s internal security to India’s eastern and northeastern states. 

This layered threat environment - combining ideological alignment with ISIS, localized recruitment, criminal financing, and cross-border sanctuary - raises concerns about coordinated or inspired attacks beyond Bangladesh’s borders. 

Security vacuum and strategic risk 

The broader context matters. Counterterrorism gains achieved after 2016 relied heavily on sustained surveillance, intelligence coordination, and political will. Any weakening of state oversight - whether due to political transition, institutional fragmentation, or resource diversion - creates opportunities for extremist regrouping.

Al Amin’s alleged ability to rebuild a network, relocate dozens of IEDs, and operate a clandestine factory within the capital’s periphery suggests exploitation of precisely such vulnerabilities. 

From a strategic standpoint, three risks stand out: 

1.   Operational Resilience: ISB demonstrates adaptability, shifting from overt cells to family-based micro-networks embedded within civilian life.

2.   Technical Capability: The confirmed use of TATP indicates access to specialized knowledge and possibly external training or digital manuals.

3.   Regional Spillover: Cross-border ideological and logistical linkages risk transforming a national threat into a sub-regional one affecting India and potentially Nepal.

Policy implications 

For Bangladesh, the immediate priority is the neutralization of remaining cells and the recapture of Al Amin. But longer-term measures require strengthened prison de-radicalization programs, tighter oversight of informal educational institutions, and improved monitoring of digital radicalization pathways.

For India and neighboring states, intelligence-sharing and joint border surveillance become essential. Jihadist networks increasingly operate in modular form, with leadership, logistics, and recruitment dispersed across jurisdictions. 

Finally, counterterrorism policy must address the narrative dimension. The symbolic declaration of a “Dhaka Regional Commander” is intended not merely to coordinate operations but to project momentum. Disrupting that narrative - through swift, transparent law enforcement success - carries strategic value equal to kinetic action. 

The Keraniganj madrasa explosion was not an isolated accident; it was an inflection point revealing the attempted resurgence of Islamic State-aligned militancy in Bangladesh. Sheikh Al Amin’s alleged transformation of a modest religious school into a high-capacity IED production hub illustrates how extremist networks adapt under pressure.