Myanmar’s Reconstruction Must Not Finance Its War Economy

Commentary

By: Mehmet Enes Beşer 

A year after the 7.7-magnitude earthquake struck central Myanmar on March 28, 2025, the International Committee of the Red Cross noted that recovery remains fragile, especially in communities already devastated by the ongoing armed conflict, which has brought the country’s economy to its knees and triggered displacement. The World Bank estimated direct physical damage at $11 billion, equal to 14 percent of gross domestic product, and expected reconstruction to support a partial economic recovery. Rebuilding is economically necessary. That does not make every contract politically neutral.

After the Myanmar government’s call for international assistance,Türkiye stepped in through the Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TİKA), which supplied shelter, food, solar lighting and waste-management support. Notably, Türkiye has a strong record of helping several countries, including Somalia during the 2011 famine, Syria during its civil war, Pakistan after earthquakes and floods, and Afghanistan. In January 2013, then-Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu first presented “humanitarian diplomacy” as a key part of Turkish foreign policy. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan later connected it to the idea of a “humanitarian foreign policy,” a term also used by the Foreign Ministry and TİKA. This approach remains central to the “Century of Türkiye” vision that President Erdoğan announced in May 2023.

This brief background is necessary to understand Türkiye’s humanitarian diplomacy under the AKP-led government.

If Turkish agencies or contractors move from relief into reconstruction, Ankara should not treat Myanmar as an ordinary post-disaster market. It should make conflict-sensitive procurement a condition of public support. If money reaches military-linked businesses, humanitarian goodwill becomes a strategic liability for Türkiye across Southeast Asia. In a war economy, the decisive question is not only what gets rebuilt, but which networks receive the land, contracts, materials, transport fees and payments.

Reconstruction Is a Financial Intervention

The first danger appears when authorities select the builder. In April 2025, Myanmar Now reported that military authorities had instructed original contractors to rebuild damaged government buildings in Naypyitaw, even though crony-linked firms and poor construction had been blamed for some losses. Not every allegation against every company has been independently established. The procurement principle is still indefensible: a firm connected to the original asset should not automatically assess the damage, price the repair and win the replacement work.

The prime contractor is the visible layer. The US Department of the Treasury noted  Myanmar Economic Holdings Public Company Limited (MEHL), a military-controlled conglomerate, has interests in banking, trade, logistics, construction and mining, with profits distributed through the armed forces. Myanmar Economic Corporation Limited (MEC) operates in mining, manufacturing and telecommunications and supplies goods to the military. A foreign company may pass a basic sanctions screening and still buy cement, aggregate, fuel, transport, storage or financial services from a military-linked network.

Checking only official sanctions lists is too narrow. The European Union has extended its Myanmar sanctions until April 30, 2027. The measures cover 105 individuals and 22 entities and prohibit making funds or economic resources available to them directly or indirectly. A Turkish company is not governed by every EU or US rule. Yet banks, insurers and multinational suppliers covered by those rules will scrutinize the transaction and may refuse it. A contract can be lawful in one jurisdiction, impossible to finance in another, and harmful to civilians in either case.

Land Can Become a New Front in the Conflict

Reconstruction also reallocates control over land. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) found that the earthquake intensified disputes over ownership, rent, shelter and rebuilding permits. Tenants and displaced families were left uncertain about their rights. A destroyed house is not vacant land, and an allocation document cannot be treated as conclusive when owners or occupants cannot safely challenge it.

Before a site is cleared, a contractor should verify parcel boundaries, ownership claims, actual occupancy and compensation arrangements. It should also provide a grievance channel that does not require residents to approach the authority that issued the contract. Otherwise, rebuilding can formalize wartime dispossession: a family loses its home during the disaster, loses the right to return during procurement and then watches a foreign-funded project make that loss permanent.

The urgency of recovery does not remove this risk. It magnifies it. Emergency procurement can shorten tender periods and simplify technical documents, but it cannot justify ignorance about who controls a supplier or who lived on a site. The United Nations Working Group on Business and Human Rights calls for heightened human-rights due diligence in conflict-affected areas because routine commercial checks do not capture the risk that business activity may worsen violence or support abusive actors.

A Turkish Reconstruction Integrity Protocol

Ankara should adopt a Myanmar Reconstruction Integrity Protocol for any project receiving TİKA support, export finance, a public guarantee or another form of state backing. Before an award, an independent reviewer should map conflict risks around the site and identify the people who ultimately own or control the main contractor, subcontractors and major suppliers. The review should continue after work begins, covering material purchases, transport providers, taxes, fees and payment channels.

Land and occupancy records should form part of the contract file, alongside engineering documents. Payments should be released against independently verified work, not certificates issued solely by the contracting authority. Contracts should permit inspection of invoices, ownership changes and the origin of major materials. They should contain immediate suspension clauses throughout the subcontracting chain when ownership is concealed, a payment route changes without explanation or credible evidence links a company or supplier to a sanctioned or military-owned entity.

Transparency requires judgment in a conflict zone. Publishing the names of vulnerable local staff could expose them to retaliation. That does not justify secrecy about who owns a company, who receives public money or whether a land claim remains contested. Personal details can stay confidential while an independent auditor, a credible civilian partner and the Turkish funding body retain access to the full record.

Smaller, community-led projects offer a better starting point than a national megaproject. UNDP has supported owner-driven housing in which families rebuild with local materials and earthquake-resistant improvements; more than 750 households had used that approach by mid-September 2025. This model is not immune to misuse, but it spreads work and income more widely and reduces dependence on a few politically connected contractors.

Türkiye should begin with one clinic, school or water system in an earthquake-affected community, implemented through a credible civilian partner. The pilot should document the land basis, itemized costs, principal suppliers, payment recipients, local wages and final beneficiaries. Success should mean restoring a service without unresolved land claims or transfers to sanctioned or military-owned entities, not merely finishing on schedule.

Before Turkish public support enters Myanmar’s reconstruction market, an independent auditor should be able to answer three questions: who occupied the land, who supplied the materials and who ultimately received each payment. If those answers cannot be verified, the project should not proceed.

Disclaimer: This paper is the author’s individual scholastic contribution and does not necessarily reflect the organization’s viewpoint.

Author bio: Mehmet Enes Beşer is a researcher focusing on ASEAN, and a graduate of Sociology in Boğaziçi University. His work examines Türkiye’s relations with Southeast Asian countries, particularly in the fields of economic development, industrial cooperation, and foreign policy. He's also the ASEAN Coordinator at Vatan Party (Türkiye) and a member of the Editorial Board of Teori magazine.